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I. Description of situation. Parties involved .
We consider here the coalitional situation inside the Catalonian Parlia-
ment after the 1980 elections. Essentially, the Parliament has 135 members;
voting is by a straight majority rule, so that any coalition of 68 or more
members will win.
In the 1980 elections six parties elected members to Parliament:
Party Members
CU (Convergencia i Unio') 43
PS (Partit dels Social istes de 33
Catalunya)
PC (Partit Social ista Unificat 23
de Catalunya)
CC (Centristes de Catalunya) 18
ER (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya) 14
PA (Partido Social ista de Andalucia) 2
Apart from this, two independents, Benet and Portabella, were elected,
giving a total of 135. We give below a brief ideological description of the
parties.
Convergencia i Unio' is a nationalist middle-of-the-road coalition,
while Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya is a moderately left-of-center nation-
alist party.
Centristes de Catalunya was a middle-of-the-road party associated with
the Union de Centro Democra'tico, the party which was, at that time, governing
Spain.
The Partit dels Social istes de Catalunya , a left-of-center party, is
associated with the Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol , which was at that
time the main opposition party at the national level.
The Partit Social ista Um'ficat de Catalunya is a communist party, with
similar policies to the Partido Comunista de Espana.
The Partido Social ista de Andalucia is a radical left-wing party which
tried to represent the Andalusian immigrants in Caralonia.
Finally, the two independent members were closely allied to the
communist party.
II. Measures of Power .
We will use the Shapley value |Shapley, 1 953 j as a measure of power in
abstract situations. Where, however, the ideological situation suggests that
some coalitions are more likely than others, we will use Owen's modification
1 1977 1 to games with a priori unions.
We refer the reader to the articles cited for mathematical details of
these values. (See also Hart and Kurz, 1984.)
The formal structure of the Parliament is an 8-element set
N = {CU,PS,PC,CC,ER,PA,b,p}
with votes as given above (b and p are the two independents, with one vote
p
each).
We then have v(S) = 1 for any coalition S with 68 or more votes;
v(S) = for other coalitions.
It is not difficult to calculate the Shapley value for this game, which
is given by the second column in Table 1 below.
Note that CC and ER, with 13.33% and 10.37% respectively of the seats,
have considerably less power - 9.29% in each case. On the other hand PA
with 1.48% of the seats has 2.62% of the power.
III. The Coalition Structures .
We proceed now to modify the value by inserting coalitional consider-
ations.
The first modification is due to the fact that both independent members
(b and p) were closely allied to the communist party - were in fact included
in its lists. This gives rise to the coalition structure
CCU}, {PS}, {PC,b,p}, {CO, {ER}, {PA}.
With this structure, the modified value now is given by the third




Party Votes Value value
co- .3185 .3405 .4000
ps .2444 .2595 .2333
PC .1704 .1738 .1889
CC .1333 .0929 .0667
ER .1037 .0929 .0667
PA .0148 .0262
b .0074 .0071 .0222
P .0074 .0071 .0222
We note that PA has, in effect, become a dummy. It is possible, as
we see, to distinguish the independents from the rest of the PC, but the
effect is small enough that we will disregard it and simply treat {PC,b,p}
as a single block. We have then a game with five players, CU, PS, PC, CC,
ER, plus a dummy, PA. The power is given in the first column of Table 2
below.
Now the coalitions become more interesting. On the one hand, a
coalition between the two left-wing parties, PS and PC, seems natural (in
fact, PC would seem to have nowhere else to go). This would give us a
structure
{CU}, {PS, PC}, {CC}, {ER},
with the value given in the second column of Table 2.
On the other hand, CU also had a possible coalition partner in CC.
In fact, CU had supported the Union de Centro Democratico in Spain's
national government. It was only normal for the coalition {CU,CC} to
form in Catalonia. This would give, instead, the structure
{CU,CC}, {PS}, {PC}, .{ER},
with value given in Table 2, third column.
Of course, both protocoal itions
,
{CU,CC} and {PS, PC}, could form,
giving the structure
{CU,CC}, {PS, PC}, {ER},
with value given in Table 2, fourth column.
At this point, of course, the moderately left party, ER, found itself
in an enviable position. With only 14 members (just over 10%), it now held
the balance of power: it could, in effect, determine whether Catalonia
would have a center-right or left-of-center government. In either case,
the opposite coalition would probably dissolve. We have, then, two alternatives
If ER joins the center-right coalition, we would have the structure
{{CU,CC}, {PS}, {PC}
with value in Table 2, fifth column, whereas, if ER joins the left-wing
coalition, we have
{{CU}, {CC}, {{PS, PC}, ER}
with value in Table 2, sixth column.
4
In either case, ER would seem to be equally well, and it would be a
question only as to ER's preferences. In fact, the first case occurred: a
right-wing coalition {{CU,CC}, ER} formed, in which CU had the bulk of the
power. Strangely enough (though not so strangely given our analysis), ER
with 14 seats has greater power than CC with 18 seats, and this is reflected
in the actual division of power since ER had greater power (in terms of
cabinet consellers ) than CC in the actual government formed. But of course




game {PS, PC} {CU,CC}
{PS, PC}
and
{CU,CC} {{CU,CC} ,ER} {{PS,PC},ER}
CU .4000 .1667 .4167 .1667 .5000
PS .2333 .2500 .1667 .1667 .3333
PC .2333 .2500 .1667 .1667 .3333
CC .0667 .1667 .0833 .1667 .1667
ER .0667 .1667 .1667 .3333 .3333 .3333
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